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OPINION   
________________ 
 
O‟MALLEY, Circuit Judge 
 
David H. Marion (“Marion”), in his capacity as receiver for Bentley Financial 
Services, Inc. (“BFS”), brought suit against Hartford Fire Insurance Company 
(“Hartford”) seeking indemnification under a fidelity bond issued by Hartford to BFS and 
the Entrust Group (“Entrust”).  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Hartford, holding that Marion failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact regarding 
whether BFS suffered a covered loss under the fidelity bond.  Because Marion set out 
sufficient material facts to support his claim that BFS incurred a covered loss when its 
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president and chief executive officer, Robert Bentley (“Bentley”), embezzled funds from 
both BFS and Entrust accounts, we reverse. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Bentley was the president and controlling shareholder of BFS, a Pennsylvania 
investment firm that brokered certificates of deposit (“CDs”).  Bentley formed Entrust to 
act as custodian for CDs brokered by BFS.  From June 1996 to October 2003, Bentley 
orchestrated a Ponzi scheme through BFS and Entrust.  A Ponzi scheme is an investment 
fraud in which investors are paid off, not with returns generated by their investments—
because their money usually is converted, not invested—but with revenue generated from 
later investors.  Here, Bentley oftentimes sold fictitious CDs, even selling the same fake 
CD to multiple customers.  When he sold actual CDs, he often misrepresented their terms 
to his customers.  Bentley would sell the CDs on behalf of BFS and instruct investors to 
send their funds to Entrust.  Entrust would sometimes transfer funds to BFS accounts, 
from which interest payments would be made to investors to help keep the scheme afloat.  
Throughout the scheme, it appears that Bentley also used both the Entrust and BFS 
accounts as personal banks—embezzling the bulk of the funds taken in for his own uses.  
Bentley was eventually prosecuted, convicted of fraud, and sentenced to fifty-five months 
of imprisonment.
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In an action bought by the Securities and Exchange Commission against Bentley, 
BFS, and Entrust, Marion was appointed receiver for all three defendants.  In this 
                                              
1
 In a previous case involving Bentley‟s scheme, this court described the fraud in more detail than is necessary here.  
See Marion v. TDI Inc., 591 F.3d 137, 141-43 (3d Cir. 2010).   
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capacity, Marion brought the current action on behalf of BFS against Hartford, seeking to 
recover under a fidelity bond issued by Hartford for the losses incurred from Bentley‟s 
scheme. 
The fidelity bond in dispute was issued by Hartford and insured both BFS and 
Entrust.  While Marion filed no action on behalf of Entrust, even though Entrust is a 
named insured on the fidelity bond, the Entrust assets are included in the BFS 
receivership.  The policy limit on the fidelity bond is $2 million, with a $10,000 
deductible.  The bond states: 
The Underwriter . . . agrees to indemnify the Insured for: 
 
INSURING AGREEMENTS 
 
FIDELITY 
(A)  Loss resulting directly from dishonest or 
fraudulent acts committed by an Employee acting alone or in 
collusion with others. 
Such dishonest or fraudulent acts must be committed 
by the Employee with the manifest intent: 
(a) to cause the Insured to sustain such loss; and 
(b)  to obtain financial benefit for the Employee or 
another person or entity. 
 
J.A. 65.  An “Employee” is defined to include, among others: 
[A]n officer or other employee of the Insured, while 
employed in, at, or by any of the Insured‟s offices or premises 
covered hereunder, and a guest student pursuing studies or 
duties in any of said offices or premises. 
 
J.A. 66.  In a section entitled “OWNERSHIP,” the bond provides further detail on 
covered losses: 
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OWNERSHIP 
 
Section 10. This bond shall apply to loss of Property (1) 
owned by the Insured, (2) held by the Insured in any capacity, 
or (3) for which the Insured is legally liable.  This bond shall 
be for the sale use and benefit of the Insured named in the 
Declarations. 
 
J.A. 69.  “Property” is defined to include, among other things, “Money,” J.A. 67, which, 
in turn, means “a medium of exchange in current use authorized or adopted by a domestic 
or foreign government as a part of its currency,” J.A. 66. 
 Before the district court, Hartford moved for summary judgment, arguing that no 
genuine dispute existed regarding whether BFS suffered a covered loss.  Specifically, 
Hartford asserted that “Bentley did not steal any money which was owned by BFS, or 
held by BFS, or for which BFS was legally liable,” J.A.  110 (Def. Hartford Fire Ins. 
Co.‟s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 11), tracking the language in the fidelity bond‟s 
ownership provision quoted above.  According to Hartford, BFS suffered no covered loss 
because “all of the money belonged to the investors.”  J.A. 112.  And BFS did not “hold” 
the money, Hartford contended, because the investor funds were held instead by Entrust 
or Bentley.  Hartford last argued that BFS was not “legally liable” for the investor funds.  
On this point, Hartford urged that, to be covered under the fidelity bond, the purportedly 
lost funds must have been obtained lawfully, not, as here, through fraud. 
Marion responded with two arguments.  First, Marion asserted that BFS 
experienced an actual loss when BFS incurred contractual liability to its investors through 
the investment contracts in which Bentley sold fictitious or misrepresented CDs on behalf 
of BFS.  But Marion did not develop this argument in his brief.  Instead, most of 
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Marion‟s opposition was based on his second argument, an embezzlement theory: BFS 
incurred a covered loss when Bentley embezzled funds that were “owned” by BFS under 
the bond.  That is, the embezzled funds were either “held” by BFS itself or were funds for 
which BFS was “legally liable.”  BFS was liable for the investor funds held by Entrust, 
Marion argued, because BFS was the entity that actually sold the fraudulent investments 
and, thus, was liable to investors for those sales.  Marion further contended that the 
embezzled funds were constructively held by BFS, and that the corporate distinction 
between BFS and Entrust should be disregarded (Marion acknowledged that BFS and 
Entrust are legally distinct from Bentley). 
 The district court sided with Hartford, finding that Marion failed to raise a genuine 
dispute that BFS suffered a covered loss.  It rejected Marion‟s first argument because a 
fidelity bond, which is distinct from liability insurance, is an insurance contract that 
indemnifies against the loss of property, not a contract that insures against liability to 
third parties.  Although it recognized that the fidelity bond covers the loss of property for 
which the insured is legally liable, the district court believed that a loss under the bond is 
not incurred unless the insured spends its own money as a result of the liability, i.e., until 
the insured experiences an actual monetary loss arising from the legal liability.  Because 
it found that BFS expended no money to make good on the obligations to its investors, 
the district court held that BFS suffered no covered loss.  The district court also rejected 
Marion‟s argument that BFS suffered a loss when Bentley embezzled the investor funds 
out of BFS and Entrust accounts because BFS did not “own” the embezzled funds, since 
the money belonged to the investors.  BFS challenges these rulings on appeal.  
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II. DISCUSSION 
  We review a district court‟s grant of summary judgment under a plenary standard, 
applying the same standard as the district court.  See Smith v. Borough of Dunmore, 633 
F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2011).  “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “The non-moving party is „entitled 
to every favorable inference that can be drawn from the record,‟ and we will affirm only 
if there is no genuine issue for trial.”  Smith, 633 F.3d at 179 (quoting Kautz v. Met–Pro 
Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 466 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
 This case involves the interpretation of a fidelity bond, and the parties agree that 
Pennsylvania law applies.  In that state, a “fidelity bond is a contract of insurance, and the 
rules of interpretation of insurance policies apply.”  Penn Twp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
719 A.2d 749, 750 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).  We undertake plenary review of the scope of 
an insurance policy because “the proper coverage of an insurance contract when the 
underlying facts are not in dispute is a question of law.”  Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Pepicelli, Pepicelli, Watts & Youngs, P.C., 821 F.2d 216, 219 (3d Cir. 1987).  When 
interpreting insurance contracts, “the intent of the parties as manifested by the language 
of the written instrument” controls.  Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 
469 A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983).  That is, if “the language of the contract is clear and 
unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that language.”  Id. 
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 On appeal, Marion abandons any argument that BFS‟s contractual liability to 
investors—liability it has insufficient funds to satisfy—constitutes a recoverable loss 
under the fidelity bond.  See Br. of Appellant 19 (“In no sense did Receiver ever suggest 
that BFS‟s legal liability gave rise to an insurable interest unrelated to the property 
embezzled.”).  Marion appears to recognize that such contractual obligations are not the 
proper subject of fidelity bonds.  A “fidelity bond is a contract of indemnity against loss,” 
not against liability untied to an actual loss.  11 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch 
On Insurance § 160:7 (3d ed. 2012).  For its part, Hartford does not defend the trial 
court‟s conclusion that the fidelity bond would not cover funds for which an insured is 
legally liable unless and until the insured expends its own funds to reimburse those whose 
property was stolen.  The parties narrow their focus on appeal. 
 Marion argues that, to the extent Bentley embezzled funds from BFS accounts, 
that money was clearly money “held” by BFS for investors and were funds for which 
BFS was “legally liable.”  To the extent the money was kept in Entrust accounts, Marion 
argues that Entrust was acting as the custodian of funds for which BFS remained liable at 
all times.  Hartford responds by contending that, because investor money went directly to 
Entrust accounts, it was never held by BFS; according to Hartford, that Bentley 
occasionally moved funds through BFS accounts does not change which entity actually 
“held” them.  As for the argument regarding BFS‟s legal liability for funds in either 
account, Hartford argues that one cannot be legally liable for funds within the meaning of 
the fidelity bond unless those funds were “legally” or “lawfully” obtained.   
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 We agree with Marion that there are genuine disputes of fact regarding whether 
BFS suffered covered losses under the fidelity bond arising from Bentley‟s 
embezzlement activities.  Accordingly, for the reasons explained below, we vacate the 
judgment entered in favor of Hartford and remand for further proceedings. 
The fidelity bond is clear about what it covers: it insures against the “[l]oss 
resulting directly from dishonest or fraudulent acts committed by an Employee.”  J.A. 65.    
The fidelity bond‟s ownership provision elaborates on the losses covered under the bond: 
“This bond shall apply to loss of Property (1) owned by the Insured, (2) held by the 
Insured in any capacity, or (3) for which the Insured is legally liable.”  J.A. 69.  There is 
no strict ownership requirement under the bond—property losses are covered under the 
bond even when the property is only held in some capacity for another or is property for 
which the insured is legally liable. 
Marion adduced evidence that Bentley embezzled funds which BFS held.  Bentley 
sold fraudulent CDs to investors on behalf of BFS.  The investors sent their money to 
Entrust and, at times, Entrust would, in turn, transfer investor money to BFS accounts 
from which payments to certain investors would occur.  Marion presented several 
cancelled checks that Bentley wrote to either himself or third-parties from BFS bank 
accounts.  See J.A. 271-84, 339-57.  BFS undoubtedly “held” certain funds in its own 
bank accounts and it appears undisputed that some of Bentley‟s embezzlement was of 
those funds.  We are unpersuaded that BFS had to be designated the formal custodian of 
the funds before the funds sitting in its accounts could be deemed “held” by BFS.  The 
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bond references funds “held in any capacity,” J.A. 69; even a temporary capacity or a 
clearinghouse capacity would satisfy this broad provision. 
Marion‟s argument that BFS suffered covered losses to the extent funds were 
embezzled from Entrust accounts is more complicated than his argument regarding the 
funds in BFS‟s own accounts.  Marion argues that the funds in Entrust accounts, while 
not “held” by BFS, were still funds for which BFS was legally liable.  Marion adduced 
substantial evidence in support of this theory.  He first presented evidence regarding the 
relationship between BFS and Entrust.  The investment contracts of record indicate that 
BFS was the entity making the sale.  See J.A. 201-26.  Under those contracts, BFS was 
required to purchase on behalf of the investors CDs with specific terms, and had an 
obligation to pay interest to the investors.  See id.  Pursuant to those same contracts, 
investors transferred funds to Entrust, as custodian of the sale proceeds.  BFS directed the 
transfer of monies from the Entrust accounts to the BFS accounts for various purposes, 
including making interest payments to investors.  Testimony of Bentley confirmed this 
relationship.  See J.A. 181 (Tr. of Jury Trial, Bentley Direct 90, May, 25, 2006, Marion v. 
TDI, Inc., No. 02-17176 (E.D. Pa.)) (“I formed the Entrust Group to act as the custodian 
for their certificates of deposit for the clients of Bentley Financial Services.”).  From this, 
a reasonable juror could conclude that BFS was at all times legally liable for the funds 
directed to the Entrust accounts.  We see nothing in the fidelity bond that requires that 
funds for which an insured is legally liable be maintained in an account in the insured‟s 
name. 
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Marion next adduced evidence that Bentley embezzled substantial funds from the 
Entrust accounts.  Marion produced several checks drawn from Entrust accounts.  See 
J.A. 285-95, 329-33.  And he proffered Bentley‟s testimony that Bentley regularly wrote 
checks from Entrust accounts to himself and others.  J.A. 173.  Marion then proffered 
testimony that Bentley directly deposited embezzled funds into his personal accounts and 
used the stolen money to pay taxes to cover up the scheme, to “entertain” himself and his 
employees, for his own personal country club expenses, to cover his personal trading 
losses, and for “escort services.”  J.A. 862-67.  There is, thus, material evidence on the 
record that the very type of loss covered by the fidelity bond occurred. 
Hartford‟s only contention refuting Marion‟s argument regarding its legal liability 
for Entrust funds is that, because the investor funds were not legally obtained (i.e., they 
were obtained through Bentley‟s fraud), no covered loss can result from the 
embezzlement.  We are not persuaded.  No such requirement is evident from the fidelity 
bond.  The bond covers the loss of property owned or held by BFS, or property for which 
it is legally liable, regardless of how the property is acquired.  Pennsylvania‟s principles 
of contract interpretation permit no other reading of the bond—it plainly contains no 
requirement that the funds be “legally” obtained before an insured could be deemed 
“legally liable” for them.  See Standard Venetian Blind Co., 469 A.2d at 566 (“Where, 
however, the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, a court is required to 
give effect to that language.”).  Indeed, Hartford supplies no legal authority in support of 
the position it urges.  In sum, its argument is unpersuasive. 
III. REMAND 
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We decide today only that the district court erred in granting summary judgment 
in favor of Hartford on the ground that BFS neither owned, held, nor was legally liable 
for any of the embezzled funds.  We do not address, because the record is not developed 
on them, other predicate questions relating to liability under the fidelity bond.  Thus, we 
do not determine whether the loss of any investor funds resulted “directly” from 
Bentley‟s dishonest acts or if the funds were taken with the requisite intent to cause BFS 
to sustain a loss and gain financial benefit for Bentley.  We also cannot and do not 
express an opinion on the amount of any covered loss.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court‟s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Hartford and remand this case for further proceedings in accordance 
with this decision. 
 
